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Chapter 4
Capitalism and Its Critics. A Long-Term View
Jürgen Kocka
1 The Concept
The concept “capitalism” is much younger than the historical reality it denotes. 
While “capital” and “capitalist” are older, the noun “capitalism” did not emerge 
until after the second half of the nineteenth century. The French socialist Louis 
Blanc used it in 1850, and defined it critically as “appropriation of capital by 
some, to the exclusion of others.” In 1872, the German socialist Wilhelm Lieb-
knecht railed against capitalism as a “juggernaut on the battlefields of indus-
try.” And in Britain, the Fabian John A. Hobson, a critic of imperialism, was one 
of the first to use the concept in the 1890s. However, it did not take long before 
“capitalism” moved beyond its initially critical and polemical use, becoming a 
central concept in the social sciences. German authors such as Albert Schäffle, 
Werner Sombart, Max Weber, and—in a Marxist tradition—Rudolf Hilferding, 
contributed much to this. Karl Marx had written a great deal about the “capi-
talist mode of production” and “capitalist accumulation,” but he rarely used 
the noun “capitalism,” and if so, somewhat marginally.
Presently the concept is “in,” particularly among historians, and particu-
larly in the English-speaking world. In the American Historical Association’s 
state-of-the-field volume American History now, “History of capitalism” stands 
alongside established subfields such as “women’s history” and “cultural his-
tory.” A recent front-page article in the New York Times carried the headline, “In 
History Class(es), Capitalism Sees Its Stock Soar.” Some authors have started to 
speak of a “New History of Capitalism” they see emerging. In public debates, 
capitalism remains controversial. As Sven Beckert recently observed:
During the past few years, few topics have animated the chattering classes 
more than capitalism. In the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008, 
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questions about the nature, past and viability of capitalism suddenly ap-
peared on evening talk shows and in newspapers throughout the world.1
2 Theme and Definition
The following essay takes seriously that the concept originated in Europe  before 
moving to other parts of the world. It takes into consideration that  “capitalism” 
was coined as a central concept of social criticism as well as of scholarly analy-
sis, a double function it has maintained, at least with some authors, up to the 
present time. It deals with the strange interplay, perhaps dialectics, between 
capitalism and critique of capitalism.
Although “capitalism” only became a broadly used concept after the second 
half of the nineteenth century, those who have been using it ever since do not 
doubt that it could also be applied to phenomena in periods of the past before 
the concept existed. I share this conviction.
In the form of merchant capitalism, capitalism already existed in the first 
millennium of our calendar, for example in Arabia, China, and Europe, though 
mostly just in the form of capitalist islands in a sea of predominantly non- 
capitalist relationships. In the form of finance capitalism, capitalism has 
existed since the high-medieval period in some parts of Europe; beginning in 
Northern Italy, and later moving its center to Antwerp, Amsterdam, and Lon-
don. In the early modern period, West and East European agrarian capitalism 
as well as plantation capitalism overseas have shaped our image of capitalism 
as a system of repressive domination and exploitation, even violence. All of 
this happened before industrial capitalism—starting first in England in the 
eighteenth century, then in Europe and North America—became the decisive 
driving force of capitalist expansion globally. In the present era of globaliza-
tion, these different types of capitalism coexist and interact.
When sketching such a scenario, I presuppose a definition of capitalism that 
is narrower than market economy in general, but broader than industrial capi-
talism based on wage work en masse. I want to emphasize decentralization, 
1 Sven Beckert, “The New History of Capitalism,” in Jürgen Kocka and Marcel van der Linden, 
eds., Capitalism. The Reemergence of a Historical Concept (London/New York, 2016), 235–249, 
here 235; Seth Rockman, What Makes the History of Capitalism Newsworthy? Journal of the 
Early Republic 34, no. 3 (2014): 439–466, esp. 439; Friedrich Lenger, “Die neue Kapitalismusge-
schichte. Ein Forschungsbericht als Einleitung,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 56 (2016): 3–37. 
Early usages of the concept are documented in: Jürgen Kocka, “Capitalism: The History of the 
Concept,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd ed., ed. James 
D. Wright, vol. 3 (Amsterdam, 2015), 105–110.
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commodification, and accumulation as basic characteristics of capitalism. On 
the one hand, it is essential that individual and collective actors make use of 
(property) rights that enable them to make economic decisions in a relatively 
autonomous and decentralized way. On the other hand, markets serve as the 
main mechanisms of allocation and coordination; commodification perme-
ates capitalism in many forms, including the commodification of labor. Fur-
ther, capital is central, which means utilizing resources for investment in the 
present with the expectation of higher gains in the future, accepting credit 
besides using savings and returns, dealing with uncertainty and risk, and aim-
ing for profit and accumulation. Change, growth, and expansion are inscribed, 
however, in irregular rhythms, with ups and downs, interrupted by crises.2
3 Christian Morale and Medieval Expansion of Capitalism
“It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for someone 
who is rich to enter the kingdom of God,” quotes the Gospel of Mark (10:25). 
Through sermons, visual imagery, and scriptures, the moral doctrine of the 
Christian Church shaped the views of the educated as well as the mentalities 
of the broad population in medieval Europe. It is true that this doctrine could 
concede to the useful role of merchants and the ethical value of work and 
property. It could also be interpreted very flexibly. However, in this doctrine 
the love of money is seen as a root of evil, and the conviction was predominant 
that the gains of one person would always imply losses by others. Within this 
worldview there was much distrust of great wealth and the practices of mer-
chants, which after all included credit taking, profit seeking, and competition. 
In the name of brotherly altruism and virtuous selflessness, Christian morals 
have distrusted the resolute orientation toward self-interest and have opposed 
certain capitalist practices, particularly money lending for interest. This was 
seen and forbidden as usury, at least if practiced vis-à-vis “thy brother,” that is, 
members of someone’s own group or religion, not necessarily vis-à-vis strang-
ers or others (Deuteronomy 23:20).3
2 Overview and definition based on Jürgen Kocka, Capitalism. A Short History (Princeton, N.J., 
2016), 7–24; further elaborated by Marcel van der Linden, “Final Thoughts,” in Capitalism, eds. 
Kocka and van der Linden, 251–266, esp. 255–258.
3 With many differentiations: Jacques Le Goff, La bourse et la vie: Economie et religion au 
Moyen Age (Paris, 1986); Martha C. Howell, Commerce before capitalism in Europe, 1300–1600 
(London, 2010), 261–297; Giacomo Todeschini, “Credit and Debt: Patterns of Exchange in 
Western Christian Society,” in Europas Aufstieg. Eine Spurensuche im späten Mittelalter, ed. 
Thomas Ertl (Wien, 2013), 139–160.
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Certainly, this doctrine has been circumvented in many practical ways, and 
in many ways the Church has positively contributed to the rise of markets and 
capitalist practices. Nevertheless, well into the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies, a disposition that was either skeptical of or hostile toward capitalism 
was dominant in Europe’s theologies, philosophies, and theories of society. 
This skepticism was amplified by the Republican humanism of the Renais-
sance, with its reliance on the rediscovered Aristotle, and his claim to defend 
public virtues and values against particularized self-interest, private wealth, 
and corruption.
The widespread distrust, moral rejection, and intellectual criticism, how-
ever, neither prevented nor perceptibly hindered the rise of capitalism in me-
dieval Europe. Similar to other parts of the world such as Arabia, China, and 
South Asia—although a little later than there—merchant capitalism asserted 
itself in Europe. Long-distance trade was the leading sector, across the seas and 
over land in Asia. Merchants used kin-based, origin-based, ethnic and cultural 
ties in order to build trust, protect themselves against robbery and aggression, 
or to solve economic problems through non-economic means. Most of them 
were pious Christians. They must have shared the religiously founded reser-
vations against profit seeking and accumulated wealth. Merchants accommo-
dated to such prevailing attitudes, to some extent, by adopting a lifestyle and 
imagery compatible with religion, by donating heavily to charity, by creating 
foundations, and often also by making a “final penance” in old age through 
large transfers of wealth to monasteries and churches.
At the same time they behaved as capitalists do, though within a basically 
non-capitalist environment. They were ready to accept high risks, they granted 
and received credit, they invested and competed with one another, and they 
strove for profit and accumulated wealth. Particularly when combining trading 
with banking, they could become very rich and influential. They used different 
legal forms for their projects and enterprises, both in the Roman Law and in 
the Common Law tradition. They invented new methods of transmitting, cred-
iting, paying, and computing such as double bookkeeping “alla Veneziana.” 
Most projects and enterprises were limited in size and short lived, but some 
were already multi-branch and multi-local enterprises, which sometimes sur-
vived the lifespan of their founders and were transferred to heirs and others. 
Merchants and bankers, frequently merchant bankers, were at the core of this 
very dynamic system.4
4 Josef Kulischer, Allgemeine Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit. vol i, 3rd 
ed. (Munich, 1965), 229–278; M.C. Howell, Commerce Before Capitalism in Europe, 1300–
1600 (Cambridge, 2010); K.G. Persson, “Markets and Coercion in Medieval Europe,” in The 
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Compared with other parts of the world, especially China, merchant capi-
talism in medieval Europe had two characteristics that deserve to be empha-
sized. On the one hand, merchant capital, at some points and still to a very 
limited extent, transcended the sphere of distribution and penetrated the 
sphere of production. This happened both in mining, with its huge capital re-
quirements and often quite extensive plant operations based on wage labor, 
and it happened in the cottage industries. Here and there, merchants began 
to exercise influence over artisans and cottage workers—that is, over the pro-
ducers of goods they intended to market—by advancing raw materials to pro-
ducers, placing orders, and sometimes also providing tools. We find numerous 
examples of this in the history of the wool trade in northern Italy, Flanders, 
and Brabant, starting in the thirteenth century at the latest; an early form of 
what was later termed proto-industrialization.
On the other hand, there were moves toward early forms of finance capi-
talism. From the outset, banking transactions contained elements of specula-
tion. They were settled, to the extent that they arose, by merchants along the 
way. Specialization in financial business started, and banks began to emerge 
in North Italian cities after the twelfth century. There were already 80 banks in 
Florence in 1350, some of them with several branches in a number of European 
countries. They used the money deposited with them for financing businesses 
of different types. In addition, they issued bonds to city governments, landed 
and manorial estates, and eventually also to the highest-ranking spiritual and 
worldly rulers of Europe, who were in constant need of money and found it dif-
ficult to wage their wars, fulfill their ceremonial obligations, and promote their 
territories’ expansion. State formation and the origins of financial capitalism 
were closely connected, and this nexus enabled prosperous urban citizens, a 
small elite, to establish their influence on politics while simultaneously mak-
ing their entrepreneurial success dependent on powerful rulers and their shift-
ing political fortunes. This pattern continued in the following centuries.
It seems that European capitalism was not the first, but had already become 
particularly vigorous before 1500. Its dynamics were linked to—and condi-
tioned by—the peculiar dynamics of Europe’s political structure, which was 
defined by the plurality of competing and sometimes fighting political units, in 
Cambridge History of Capitalism, vol. i, eds. L. Neal and J.G. Williamson (Cambridge, 2014), 
225–266; Jacques Le Goff, Marchands et Banquiers au Moyen Age (Paris, 1956); Jacques Le 
Goff, Le Moyen Age et l’Argent (Paris, 2010); Giacomo Todeschini, “Theological Roots of the 
Medieval/Modern Merchants’ Self-Representation,” in The Self-Perception of Early Modern 
Capitalists, eds. Margaret C. Jacobs and Catherine Secretan (London, 2008), 17–46; Herman 
Van der Wee and G. Kurgan-van Hentenryk, eds., A History of European Banking, 2nd ed. 
( Antwerp, 2000), 71–112.
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contrast for example to China and its comprehensive empire. This pluralistic 
political structure offered European capitalists particular incentives, opportu-
nities, and influence.5
4 Business, Violence and Enlightenment: Capitalist Expansion  
in the Early Modern Period
The European expansion into the rest of the world since the fifteenth century 
had many motives and driving forces, but the resources, ambitions, greed, and 
enterprising spirit of West European commercial and finance capitalists were, 
no doubt, among them. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, capital-
ism developed a new pattern: In overseas trade, in the colonies, and connected 
with this, in the economic life of Europe. A new symbiosis between business 
and violence characterized capitalism during those centuries, particularly 
outside Europe—but under the influence of Europeans—as became evident 
in the many wars and raids, but also in the plantation system on the basis of 
unfree labor. Certainly, slavery was not a capitalist invention, but the capital-
ist plantation economy in Brazil, the Caribbean, and the southern regions of 
North America triggered a huge expansion of the slave trade and slavery. Ac-
cording to Marx, modern capitalism came into the world soaked in blood and 
filth, as a result of violence and suppression. This is only a half-truth historical-
ly, but none the less a correct observation when one considers the connection 
between the rise of capitalism and colonization. This connection is currently 
intensively researched.6
Within Europe, capitalism continued its expansion into the world of 
production, which was accordingly reshaped. Think of the different types 
of agrarian capitalism in Western and Eastern Europe, think of mining and 
metal-producing industries, and think of the proto-industrial reorganization 
of cottage industry in most industrial regions of Europe. Productivity growth 
was one major consequence that decisively improved the life chances—and 
5 This essentially older argument (Max Weber, Otto Hintze, Kenneth Pomeranz, Peer Vries) is 
well developed in: E.H. Mielants, The Origins of Capitalism and the “Rise of the West” (Phila-
delphia, 2007); in another version in: R. Bin Wong and J.-L. Rosenthal, Before and Beyond 
Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in China and Europe (Cambridge, MA, 2011).
6 E.g. in: E.E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capital-
ism (New York, 2014); Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York, 2014); Sven 
Beckert and Seth Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of American Economic 
Development (Philadelphia, 2015); Karl Marx, Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 
Marx/Engels Werke, vol. 33 (Berlin, 1962), 788.
77Capitalism and Its Critics
<UN>
frequently the survival chances—of a rapidly growing population. However, 
new forms of inequality, dependence, and exploitation also followed, which 
could not be realized without some violence and many social conflicts.
The combination of merchant and finance capitalism with colonialism trig-
gered innovations. The enterprise, a core element of capitalism in its process 
of consolidation, became more clearly profiled by gaining elements of a legal 
and institutional identity beyond the people who founded and managed it. 
The Dutch Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (the voc, founded in 1602) 
was just one, but a famous example among several firms founded for the pur-
pose of colonial trade in a number of countries, especially in the Netherlands, 
England, and France. An impressive capital fund (6.5 million guilders) on the 
basis of shares, more than 200 shareholders with limited liability, power with a 
board of directors, sophisticated organization with a transnational and trans-
regional reach, a central office in Amsterdam soon with about 350 employees, 
a diversified portfolio of trading activities including some production units, for 
example a spinning mill in India: A very modern corporation, indeed. Howev-
er, it rested on the foundations of political privilege and was a monopoly with 
extensive quasi-governmental powers. The Dutch government had conferred 
on the voc the right to operate all Dutch trading business east of the Cape of 
Good Hope, along with the authorization to wage war, conclude treaties, take 
possession of land, and build fortresses. The voc executed these rights, often 
in armed struggle with competitors from other countries. The distinction be-
tween conducting capitalist business and waging war was fluid. There were 
years in which the company apparently drew the major share of its income 
from the seizure of competing or enemy ships.
The voc held together until 1799, while its shareholders continuously 
changed. They could easily enter and leave the corporation because they could 
sell and buy their shares on newly emerging stock markets; in Antwerp from 
1460, in Amsterdam from 1612, and in London from 1698, with a precursor 
from 1571. The shares of the monopoly companies engaged in colonial busi-
ness represented a considerable proportion of the commercial papers traded 
on the stock exchanges. Capital increasingly became a commodity, and the 
speculative elements associated with it grew by leaps and bounds. Not only 
did the prospect of spectacular profits increase as a result, but also the danger 
of great losses. Both the opportunities and the perils soon affected not just 
a small number of active, professional trade capitalists, but also an increas-
ing number of small and large investors from wide sections of the population 
in western European metropolises. In the course of the seventeenth century 
they learned how to try their luck on the stock exchange, to bet, to invest, and 
to speculate, with prospects and dangers. The downfall of the English South 
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Sea Company in 1720 was preceded by fully-fledged speculation mania. The 
British government had granted the company a monopoly on trade with South 
America, even including all the rights to regions not yet discovered! The public 
expected huge gains. A run on shares set in, and the share price rose from 100 
to 905 pounds within just one month. Broad segments of the population en-
trusted their money to the company and lost it when the bubble burst in the 
summer of 1720, and the share price went into free fall. Sir Isaac Newton was 
among the victims. He is supposed to have said: “I can calculate the motions of 
erratic stars, but not the madness of the multitude.” The macro-economic and 
social consequences of such crises still remained quite limited. Yet, via stock 
market and speculation, larger segments of society got their first introduction 
to the hopes and disappointments, the gains and the losses that capitalism so 
abundantly held in store for them.
The rise of finance capitalism not only followed from the growing credit 
needs of trade and production through expansion. Rather, the services pro-
vided by banks were also requested by those in power; by city governments 
and ruling aristocrats, and later on above all, by the governments of the power-
ful territorial states just establishing themselves by competing and sometimes 
by fighting with one another. Step by step, the center of transnational finance 
capitalism moved to Western Europe, first to Antwerp and Amsterdam, then 
later to London.7
In the Netherlands and in England particularly, capitalist principles af-
fected social life beyond the economy, sociability, consumption, leisure activi-
ties, betting and sports, the relation between the sexes, and the distribution of 
political power. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Netherlands 
and England were the most capitalist countries in Europe and, for that matter, 
the world. It is worthwhile to note that they were also the most prosperous 
countries and certainly also the freest in Europe, on the way to constitutional 
government and a dynamic civil society.
I have discussed the skepticism about trade and capitalism, and the anti-
capitalist sentiments dominant in medieval Europe, under the influence 
7 Last paragraphs based on Kocka, Capitalism, 54–83. On European expansion to Asia: Wolf-
gang Reinhard, Kleine Geschichte des Kolonialismus, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart, 2008), 27–65, esp. 
42–47 (voc); P.A. Frentrop, History of Corporate Governance, 1602–2002 (Amsterdam, 2002), 
49–114; Newton quote: Patrick Brantlinger, Fictions of State: Culture and Credit in Britain, 
1694–1994 (Ithaca, NY, 1996), 44; C.P. Kindleberger and R. Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: 
A History of Financial Crises, 5th ed. (Hoboken, NJ, 2005), 42, 58; Van der Wee and Kurgan-
Van Hentenryk, eds., History, 117–264, esp. 260; T. Sokoll, Europäischer Bergbau im Übergang 
zur Neuzeit (Idstein, 1994); P. Kriedte et al., Industrialization before Industrialization: Rural 
Industry in the Genesis of Capitalism (Cambridge, 1981); Robert Brenner, “The Agrarian Roots 
of European Capitalism,” Past & Present 97 (1982): 16–113.
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of Christian moral doctrine and other factors. Certainly, Reformation and 
Counter- Reformation brought about a “modern religiosity” that stressed the 
“worldliness of faith”8 and contributed to an upgraded appreciation of work and 
profession. Max Weber has emphasized this, not without some justification.
Nevertheless, it was not so much the Reformation, but instead the Enlight-
enment that brought about a re-assessment in contemporary thinking about 
capitalism and its reputation, at least among intellectuals and probably 
 beyond. Under the impact of their era’s destructive wars, authors such as 
Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, and Spinoza worked at redefining the virtues of civil 
society with a secularizing thrust and informed by a concern about human 
rights, freedom, peace, and prosperity. In 1748, in a clear withdrawal from the 
old  European mainstream, Montesquieu praised trade as a civilizing force 
that contributed to overcoming barbarism, calming aggression, and refining 
manners. Other authors chimed in to the same tune, among them Bernard 
de Mandeville and  David Hume, Condorcet, and of course Adam Smith; all 
of them West  European thinkers. The common good, went the thrust of these 
arguments, is actually promoted by the reasonable pursuit of self-interest; the 
advantage of the one need not be to the disadvantage of the other. Commerce 
and morality were not locked into inevitable opposition. The market helped re-
place the war of passions with the advocacy of interests. Commerce was said to 
promote such virtues as diligence and persistence, uprightness, and discipline.
Overall, a fundamental affirmation of society’s new capitalist tendencies 
was starting to emerge. It was expected not only that these tendencies would 
increase prosperity, but also that they would contribute to creating a new so-
cial order that was better for human cooperation, one without arbitrary state 
intervention, with respect for liberty and individual responsibility, and with 
the capacity for resolving conflicts through compromise instead of war. Cer-
tainly, these authors did not use the concept “capitalism.” Adam Smith wrote 
about “commercial society.” However, basically this was a legitimizing vision of 
capitalism as a civilizing promise in the spirit of Enlightenment.
With regard to appreciation by intellectuals and to public opinion, capital-
ism had its best time in the second half of the eighteenth century. However, 
again there was a wide gap between reality and discourse; now between the 
deep contradictions of capitalist reality and its utopian idealization in terms 
of “doux commerce” and “commercial society.”9
8 Heinz Schilling, Martin Luther. Rebell in einer Zeit des Umbruchs (Munich, 2012), 634.
9 Most important: Albert O. Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 105–141, esp. 106; very good: Jerry Z. Muller, The Mind and the Mar-
ket: Capitalism in Western Thought (New York, 2002; paperback 2003), 3–19 (on the older more 
skeptical perspectives) and 51–83 (on Smith); on changing views in the eighteenth century: 
J.  Appleby, The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism (New York, 2010), 87–120; on 
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5 Industrial Capitalism and Classical Critique in the Long  
Nineteenth Century
I am jumping forward by one century. In Werner Sombart’s and Max Weber’s 
analysis of capitalism, for example, there was much confidence in the economic 
superiority and the economic rationality of capitalism. However, these authors 
did not see capitalism anymore as a carrier of human progress, moral improve-
ment, and civilizational uplift. On the contrary, liberals like Weber feared the 
increasing rigidity of the system that he anticipated would threaten human 
freedom by coercing economic actors to function according to its increasingly 
compulsive rules of relentless competition and growth, or to drop out of the 
market altogether. Among conservatives as well as on the left, capitalism was 
seen as an irresistible force of erosion: Custom was seen to be replaced by con-
tract, Gemeinschaft by Gesellschaft, the traditional by the modern, and social 
bonds by the market. On the right, anti-capitalism frequently went hand in 
hand with anti-liberalism and anti-Semitism, particularly after the Great De-
pression of the 1870s. The socialist critique of capitalism was different, and the 
most powerful one. On the one hand, it attacked the exploitation of labor by 
capital, the increase of social inequality, the lack of a fair deal, and alienation 
and suppression in the workplace. On the other hand, it predicted the decline 
of capitalism due to its internal contradictions and its replacement by some-
thing new; namely socialism. Many of those who did not enjoy this perspective 
did not contest it either, but were fearful of its arrival.
The discourse of ascent and flourishing had largely been replaced by a dis-
course of fall and decline. I mentioned at the beginning that this was the intel-
lectual, mental situation in which the concept of capitalism emerged, first as 
a critical and polemical concept; soon to be turned into a powerful analytical 
tool. The concept emerged, one might say, as a concept of difference. It was used 
to identify and critically underline certain features of the present, in contrast 
to what it was thought to have been in previous times, and to what it might be-
come under socialism in the future. The contrast with a selectively commemo-
rated past and with an imagined future was constitutive for the emergence of 
the concept “capitalism,” and in a way this mechanism still works today when 
it comes to more basic discussions of capitalism.10
 changing cultural practices in England: Christiane Eisenberg, The Rise of Market Society in 
England, 1066–1800 (New York, 2014), 73–100.
10 Documentation in Kocka, “Capitalism: The History of the Concept.” On the temporal 
structure of capitalist practices and debates about capitalism: Jens Beckert, Imagined 
Futures. Fictional Expectations and Capitalist Dynamics (Cambridge, MA, 2016). On 
Max Weber’s notions of capitalism: Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of 
8�Capitalism and Its Critics
<UN>
How can we explain this change in the evaluation of capitalism between 
the late eighteenth, late nineteenth, and early twentieth century; this change 
of mood from appreciation to criticism? Let me pick out three relevant issues.
1. While Adam Smith had known capitalism before industrialization, nine-
teenth-century capitalism mainly spread in the form of industrial capitalism, 
based on the factory system and wage labor en masse. Now the capitalist prin-
ciple of commodification was fully extended into the sphere of work and la-
bor, to the activities of human beings on a grand scale. Work relations were 
becoming capitalist, which meant that they became dependent on changing 
market mechanisms, subject to ever stricter calculation, and subordinated to 
supervision by employers or managers. At the same time, industrial wealth was 
accumulated to an unprecedented degree, due to an increasing need for large-
scale fixed capital in mines, factories, railways, and other institutions of indus-
trial capitalism. As a consequence, wealth differences became more visible, 
and stricter controls of profitability over time were felt to be needed and were 
practiced by employers and managers. The class difference had been built into 
capitalism as a potentiality from the start; now it became more manifest. It 
could be directly experienced, widely observed, and critically discussed. This 
was the constellation—industrial capitalism with the factory system, large-
scale capital accumulation, and wage labor as a mass phenomenon—which 
served as the empirical base for the classic narratives of Marx and Engels, and 
for the rise of labor movements critical of or hostile to (basic elements of) 
capitalism.11
2. Technological and organizational innovation became much more im-
portant, frequent, and regular under industrial capitalism than ever before. In 
other words, what Joseph A. Schumpeter would later call “creative destruction” 
became the rule and a widespread experience. Factories pushed aside cottage 
work in the spinning of yarn and the weaving of clothes. Steamships replaced 
traditional forms of transportation on rivers, canals, and oceans. Producers of 
electrical installations gained superiority over the providers of gas-powered 
Interpretive Sociology, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, CA, 1978, reprint-
ed 2013), 63–166, 351–54, 1094–110; Max Weber, General Economic History, trans. Frank H. 
Knight (Glencoe, IL, 1927, reprinted 1950), 275–369; Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism, (1920), revised, trans. and intro. Stephen Kalberg (New York, 2010); 
Werner Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus, 3 vols. 2nd ed. (Munich/Leipzig, 1924–1927).
11 With reference to the German case: Jürgen Kocka, Arbeitsverhältnisse und Arbeiterex-
istenzen: Grundlagen der Klassenbildung im 19. Jahrhundert (Bonn, 1990); Jürgen Kocka, 
Arbeiterleben und Arbeiterkultur. Die Entstehung einer sozialen Klasse (Bonn, 2015); Marcel 
van der Linden and J. Rojahn, eds., The Formation of Labour Movements 1870–1914, 2 vols. 
(Leiden, 1990).
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lighting. This was a process opening up new opportunities to many and new 
roads towards success, but there were also numerous losers at the same time. 
Ascent and decline are mechanisms anchored right at the core of capitalism. 
Permanent competition, sustained insecurity, and threatening dangers were 
institutionalized; and resented. There were many losers. All of this came in 
cycles, with ups and downs, booms and busts. Nineteenth-century crises im-
pacted on large segments of the populations. The crises helped to delegitimize 
capitalism and increase anti-capitalist resentment.12
3. There was a rise of expectations. Partly as a precondition and partly as a 
consequence of capitalist industrialization, previous patterns of social control 
were loosened, the standard of living was raised, fast historical change was ex-
perienced, and human affairs appeared—in fact proved—to be changeable. 
The level of education was raised, and public spaces emerged in which intel-
lectuals and the media played a dynamic, frequently a critical, role. As a con-
sequence, people became less patient, more demanding, and more critical. In 
a way, capitalism’s critique followed from capitalism’s success; something ana-
lyzed by Joseph Schumpeter and Albert Hirschman as capitalism’s propensity 
to undermine itself.
All of this had surfaced by the end of the nineteenth and the start of the 
twentieth century, very much in contrast to the period of Adam Smith. While 
capitalism developed its strengths and powerfully expanded—both internally 
(into different spheres of life) and externally (towards different parts of the 
world)—its image darkened, its evaluation became increasingly pessimistic, 
and its past and its present were heavily criticized.
6 The Present Situation
Since then another century has passed, which has brought deep changes dif-
ferent from what Max Weber and his contemporaries had expected. There 
have been far-reaching technical and organizational innovations, the digital 
revolution of recent decades among them. There has been an unprecedented 
expansion and differentiation of consumption, including mass consumption, 
but also pronounced socioeconomic inequality which, within our societies, 
has started to grow again since the 1970s. In this “century of extremes” (Eric 
J. Hobsbawm), people in Europe and elsewhere have experienced unprece-
dented social, political, and cultural upheaval, somehow related to capitalism, 
12 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd ed. (New York, 1947), 
81–86 (“creative destruction”).
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largely initiated by Europeans, but impacting on most other parts of the world 
as well, among them the deep crisis of capitalism in the interwar period facili-
tating the rise of fascism and World War ii.
We have experienced the rise of a powerful, anti-capitalist alternative: The 
Soviet type of state socialism, which radicalized the rejection of capitalism in 
a very practical and effective way for decades, before it lost out in a worldwide 
conflict and imploded.
Particularly in Europe, coordinated, organized, regulated forms of capi-
talism were invented and made concrete with the help of organized interest 
groups, including organized labor, and with the welfare state as its centerpiece. 
The beginnings of “organized capitalism”—others prefer to speak of “coordi-
nated capitalism” or the “Keynesian welfare state”—can be traced back to the 
late nineteenth century and World War i, but it really flourished in the third 
quarter of the twentieth century, when it proved to be very compatible with 
representative democracy. However, it has been questioned (though not at 
all destroyed) under the more market-radical, “neo-liberal” auspices in more 
recent decades, which have been characterized by an unproportional rise of 
finance capitalism and financialization.
In the latter part of the twentieth and the early twenty-first century, 
globalization—understood as increasing interdependence, not as increasing 
convergence—proceeded with accelerated speed, across borders between 
countries and world regions; conditioned by and affecting large parts of capi-
talism that have become more transnational and global than ever before. This 
poses an unresolved problem for any form of regulation and coordination of 
capitalism by political means, since political power is still largely vested in 
competing national states (the criticism of capitalism and the criticism of 
globalization are nowadays intrinsically mixed). The global dimension of 
present-day capitalism dramatically increases its destructive impact on the 
natural environment including climate; a problem largely absent in previous 
centuries.13
13 The concept “organized capitalism” goes back to Rudolf Hilferding. See his Das Finanz-
kapital (Vienna, 1910). The concept was successfully tried out for purposes of historical 
analysis: Heinrich August Winkler, ed., Organisierter Kapitalismus: Voraussetzungen und 
Anfänge (Göttingen, 1974). Also see Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State 
Tradition (Oxford, 1993). Relevant debates in the U.S. are analyzed in: H. Brick, Transcend-
ing Capitalism: Visions of a New Society in Modern American Thought (Ithaca, NY, 2006). 
On the movements away from “organized capitalism” in many Western countries since the 
1970s/1980s: Claus Offe, Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary Transformation of Work 
and Politics (London, 1985); P. Mirowski and D. Plehwe, eds., The Road from Mont Pèlerin: 
The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective (Cambridge, MA, 2009); G.R. Krippner, 
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As mentioned in the beginning, more and more authors find the concept 
“capitalism” useful, in one way or another. Especially when it comes to dis-
cussing complex connections among economic, social, political, and cultural 
dimensions of historical reality, and to synthesizing or making broad compari-
sons across space and time, historians and historically oriented social scien-
tists make use of the concept. On the other hand, the concept continues to 
serve as an interpretative concept that invites fundamental debate about the 
past, present, and future. It certainly plays a role in intellectual and political 
debates outside the scholarly world, too, as it already had around 1900.
There are authors who use the concept of capitalism with clearly positive 
overtones, for example economists in the tradition of the Chicago School. Take 
the late Gary Becker as an example, who wrote: “Capitalism with free markets is 
the most effective system yet devised for raising both economic well-being and 
political freedom.” In popular literature too, the term “capitalism” is used in an 
affirmative sense.14 There are also numerous examples of a primarily analytical, 
“neutral” use of the concept, such as in the long and ongoing debate by econo-
mists and political scientists about “varieties of capitalism.” In this debate, we 
usually distinguish between types of capitalism according to different relation-
ships between market and state, ranging from a relatively market-radical model, 
especially in the U.S., to state-capitalist forms, especially in East Asia, with dif-
ferent forms of coordinated or organized capitalism in combination with strong 
welfare state elements in the middle, especially on the European continent.15
Anyone who takes a serious look at the history of capitalism and, moreover, 
knows something about life in centuries past that were either not capitalist 
or were barely so, cannot but be impressed by the immense progress that has 
taken place in large parts of the world (though not everywhere). In spite of its 
very unequal distribution, this progress has also impacted on the broad masses 
of people who did not and do not belong to the elites and well-situated upper-
strata; with regard to material living conditions and everyday life, gains in life 
Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance (Cambridge, 2011); Ivan 
T. Berend, An Economic History of Nineteenth-Century Europe (Cambridge, 2013); Jürgen 
Osterhammel and N.P. Petersson, Globalization: A Short History (Princeton, NJ, 2009). My 
view on financialization, deregulation, and the changing relations between markets and 
states in recent decades is presented in Kocka, Capitalism, 114–124, 145–161.
14 G.S. Becker and G.N. Becker, The Economics of Life: From Baseball to Affirmative Action to 
Immigration. How Real-World Issues Affect Our Everyday Life (New York, 1997); J. Mackey, 
Conscious Capitalism: Liberating the Heroic Spirit of Business (Cambridge, MA, 2013).
15 Cf. P.A. Hall and D. Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage (Oxford, 2001); B. Amable, The Diversity of Modern Capitalism 
(Oxford, 2003); R. Dore, Stock Market Capitalism, Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany 
versus the Anglo-Saxons (Oxford, 2000).
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span and health, opportunities for choice, and freedom.16 It was progress of 
which one might say, in retrospect that it would presumably not have hap-
pened without capitalism’s characteristic way of constantly stirring things up, 
pushing them forward, and reshaping them. To date, alternatives to capital-
ism have proven inferior, both with regard to the creation of prosperity and 
to the facilitation of freedom. The downfall of the centrally administered 
state- socialist economies in the last third of the twentieth century was, in this 
 respect, a key process for evaluating the historical balance sheet of capitalism.
Nevertheless, particularly in Europe the concept continues most frequently 
to be used with skeptical or pessimistic overtones, in a spirit of criticism or at 
least of ambivalence, and with much sensitivity for the dark sides of capital-
ism’s record. There are notable continuities in the criticism of capitalism. Take 
the catholic social teaching as an example, with its critique of the “idolatry of the 
market” and its rejection of “radical capitalist ideology” (Centesimo Annus, the 
papal encyclical of 1991). The current pope, undoubtedly against the background 
of his experiences of countries from the Global South, has again intensified the 
tone of the Catholic critique.17 Other examples of discursive continuities can 
be found in different currents of (what I want to call) a totalizing critique that 
rejects “capitalism” as the epitome of (Western) modernity or as the outright 
embodiment of evil. This type of fundamentalism is hard to discuss.18 Now, as 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, criticism of capitalism can be raised 
from standpoints on the political left—for example by rejecting inequalities 
and dependencies coming with capitalist relations—or from standpoints on 
the political right—for example with anti-liberal, anti-cosmopolitan, nativist 
implications. Politically, Kapitalismuskritik is polyvalent and ambiguous.
Some critiques of capitalism that were once at the center of attention have, 
however, moved to the margins. This is true for the classical Marxist critique 
of capitalism as the site of the alienation of labor and of the immiseration 
of the working class. In most economically developed parts of the world, the 
“labor question” has ceased to have the explosive and mobilizing effects it 
used to display in the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth century. 
16 Usefully summarized in J.L. Van Zanden et al., How Was Life? Global Well-Being Since 1820 
(Paris, 2014). Along a similar line: Angus Deaton, The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the 
Origins of Inequality (Princeton, 2013).
17 Amintori Fanfani, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism (Norfolk, VA, 2002); Andrea 
Tornielli and Giacomo Galeazzi, This Economy Kills: Pope Francis on Capitalism and Social 
Justice (Liturgical Press, 2015).
18 Examples can be found in C. Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capi-
talism (Cambridge, 2006), though such totalizing condemnations of capitalism are also 
not unknown in the West.
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Nevertheless, at the global level it deserves to be rediscovered, given the mas-
sive spread of so-called “informal labor” under conditions of capitalist exploi-
tation in the Global South.19
Other topics have moved to the foreground. Concrete abuses are de-
nounced, such as “structured irresponsibility” in the financial sector. That lack 
of accountability has led to a widening gap—incidentally, in violation of one 
of capitalism’s central premises—between deciding, on the one hand, and 
answering to the consequences of decisions, on the other. As a result, exor-
bitant profits for money managers are facilitated by public budgets that take 
on  gigantic losses (“too big to fail”).20 Moreover, the contemporary critique 
of growing inequality as a consequence of capitalism is becoming ever more 
 urgent. Here, public discussion has focused on the kind of inequality of income 
and of wealth distribution that since the 1970s has become much more severe 
inside most individual countries; there has been less interest in the much more 
serious inequality that exists between countries and regions of the globe. The 
latter grew immensely between 1800 and 1950, but no longer did so after that. 
Lamenting the growth of inequality blends into protest against infringements 
on distributive justice, which is how the critique becomes systemically rele-
vant.21 One criticizes the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the claim of 
democratic politics to shape our common destinies according to democratic 
principles and procedures, and on the other hand, the dynamic of capital-
ism that evades democratic politics. The relationship between capitalism and 
 democracy continues to be a much discussed theme.22 Also lamented are the 
perennial insecurity, unrelenting acceleration pressures, and extreme individ-
ualization that are inherent to capitalism and that may lead, in the absence 
of countermeasures, to the erosion of social welfare and neglect of the public 
19 Basic: Marcel van der Linden, Workers of the World: Essays Toward a Global Labor History 
(Leiden, 2008). Cf. J. Breman, Outcast Labour in Asia: Circulation and Informalization of 
the Workers at the Bottom of the Economy (Oxford, 2012); Andreas Eckert, “Capitalism and 
Labor in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Capitalism, eds. Kocka and Van der Linden, 165–185.
20 C. Honegger et al., eds., Strukturierte Verantwortungslosigkeit: Berichte aus der Bankenwelt 
(Frankfurt, 2010).
21 Cf. A.B. Atkinson, Inequality. What Can be Done? (Cambridge, MA, 2015); Thomas Piketty, 
Capital in the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge, MA, 2014); Branco Milanovic, Global In-
equality. A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (Cambridge, MA, 2016).
22 Jürgen Kocka, Capitalism is not Democratic and Democracy not Capitalistic. Tensions and 
Opportunities in Historical Perspective (Florence, 2015); Jürgen Kocka, “Kapitalismus und 
Demokratie. Der historische Befund,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 56 (2016): 39–50: Cap-
italism has existed and flourished under different political systems. There is scope for 
political choice and shaping. Much depends on the political orientations and energies a 
community can mobilize.
87Capitalism and Its Critics
<UN>
interest. Similar, in the way it poses fundamental questions, is the critique of 
capitalism’s intrinsic dependence on permanent growth and constant expan-
sion beyond the attained status quo; a dependence that threatens to destroy 
natural resources (the environment and climate) and cultural resources (soli-
darity and meaning). These are resources that capitalism needs in order to sur-
vive, but that it increasingly exhausts and destroys.23 This, in turn, raises the 
urgent question of where the limits of the market and of venality lie, or where—
on moral or practical grounds—they should be drawn. The historical overview 
offers strong arguments for the case that there is a need for such boundaries: 
That capitalism, in other words, cannot be allowed to permeate everything, but 
that it needs non-capitalist abutments in society, culture, and the state.24
Certainly, there are those who defend capitalism in the public debate. They 
have good arguments, which demonstrate its achievements, its alliance with 
progress, and its beneficial effects over the centuries. However, by and large 
the critical, skeptical, pessimistic arguments, connotations, and overtones 
 dominate—particularly since the Great Recession of 2008—both in public de-
bates and in relevant parts of the social sciences, at least in Europe. Writings 
about “postcapitalism” are selling well, nowadays with frequent references to 
the impact of digitalization and the inclination to predict the imminent end of 
capitalism as we have known it.25 With changing arguments in detail, this type 
of literature has a long tradition.
7 Conclusion and Coda
At any point in time, very different and even contradictory assessments of cap-
italism have coexisted or competed, which is why it is hard to generalize. If we 
23 E.g., Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything. Capitalism vs. the Climate (New York, 2014); 
Jürgen Renn and Bernd Scherer, eds., Das Anthropozän. Zum Stand der Dinge (Berlin, 
2015); Michael Mann, “The End May Be Nigh, But for Whom?” in Does Capitalism Have 
a Future? eds. Immanuel Wallerstein et al. (Oxford, 2013), 71–97. On p. 94 Mann convinc-
ingly puts the relationship between capitalism and climate change in a much broader and 
more complex perspective: “The three great triumphs of the modern period—capitalism, 
the nation-state, and citizen rights—are responsible for the environmental crisis.”
24 There is something to be learned from very different authors such as Karl Polányi, The 
Great Transformation, New York, 1944); Schumpeter, Capitalism; M.J. Sandel, What Money 
Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (New York, 2012).
25 Wolfgang Streeck, “How will Capitalism End?” New Left Review 87 (2014): 35–64; Jeremy 
Rifkin, The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the Collaborative Commons, 
and the Eclipse of Capitalism (New York, 2015); Paul Mason, PostCapitalism: A Guide to the 
Future (London, 2016).
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do nevertheless generalize, we may conclude that over the centuries in Europe, 
the rise, the breakthrough, and finally the triumph of capitalism have taken 
place in an intellectual and mental climate of pronounced Kapitalismuskri-
tik, or criticism of capitalism. If this conclusion is correct, one may wonder 
why these skeptical and critical sentiments and convictions have not hindered 
or handicapped the real rise of European or European-sponsored capitalism 
more than is apparently the case. An achievement with a bad conscience? 
A typical contradiction between basis and superstructure? A century-old 
hypocrisy not unknown in the history of public morale and noble principles? 
A European Sonderweg?
One can offer a more constructive hypothesis and hold that the widespread 
criticism of capitalism has contributed to its permanent change and reform—
as well as indirectly and inadvertently to its survival and success—over the 
centuries. One could show in detail that ideas and discourses of Kapitalis-
muskritik, once they managed to be translated into social and political energy, 
have led to reforms that improved and civilized capitalism, making it more 
compatible with human needs. This has enhanced its social acceptance and 
ultimately its capability to survive. It is neither guaranteed nor excluded that 
this mechanism will continue to work in the future.
Sometimes the difficult and ambivalent concept “capitalism” reminds me 
of the similarly difficult and ambivalent concept “modernity.”26 Both con-
cepts relate to an impressive multitude of very different empirical phenom-
ena, with respect to which one sometimes wonders why they should be as-
sembled under one and the same conceptual roof. Both are rather abstract 
constructs, which were originally created by relating them to basic value 
judgements. Both share particular temporal structures in that they try to 
make present phenomena intelligible by differentiating them from past and 
future phenomena; from objects of remembrance on the one hand, and from 
objects of imagination on the other. In one case (modernity), hope and the 
expectation of progress stimulated the conceptual construction, in the other 
case (capitalism), it was criticism. In both cases, concepts emerged from acts 
of evaluation, but this did not prevent them from becoming instruments of 
sophisticated analysis.
The comparison with the concept “modernity” highlights the fact that 
the concept “capitalism” not only serves the purpose of understanding and 
26 Cf. Paul Nolte, “Modernization and Modernity in History,” in International Encyclopedia 
of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 15, eds. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (Oxford, 
2001), 9954 ff.; Peter Wagner, Modernity as Experience and Interpretation: A New Sociology 
of Modernity (London, 2008).
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interpreting present realities, but also serves as a conceptual foil on which very 
different expectations, anxieties, and hopes can be projected in order to be 
articulated, asserted and, if possible, accomplished. That means that the con-
cept may tend to change the reality that it helps to represent and understand: 
The concept as a sort of intervention.
